Allied service members

Reference 6211

Captain MacGrath's account from the 116th Regiment's communications group

Report by Captain MacGrath, Service Co/116RCT

This officer is probably the one who completed both the longest and most diverse course on June 6, 1944 on Omaha Beach.

"I landed with the Signals section and 2 staff groups towards H+85 (7:55), 15 minutes after the scheduled time (7:40 a.m., the vessel was an LCM planned for the Dog Green/Dog White boundary and approached 900m east of St-Laurent-Les Moulins, moved by current like most small barges). We found only one space available on the beach. The tide was rising very quickly and the beach was crowded with men, most of them still and apparently unable to move. At that time machine gun fire was weakening and an opportunity seemed to arise to get them out. The wall behind the pebbles was also crowded with soldiers lying behind.

Major McWharter, liaison officer of 9ème Air Force, was with me. We both understood that it was imperative to leave the beach, because the congestion was such that no one else could have made a place there.

We talked to the men and tried to convince them to follow us. None of them, however, accepted, as they seemed paralyzed by fear.

I saw Major Weller and told him that I thought getting the men off the beach was the most important thing for us, he told me he would do what he could. Then I went to the hill in reconnaissance. The terrain was usually marked by signs pointing to mines, in fact there were so many that they had to be ignored if one wanted to move forward (most of the minefields were fake).

There was not much artillery fire in the vicinity, as I headed towards an abandoned house on the hill, but violent gunfire on the left was worrying. Weller dislodged me before I got home and there we met a part of the K's Cie (? Unreadable). It was a little before 10:00. Weller said he was going to try to get the battalion together (the 2nd)ème or 3ème?). So I decided to go back to the beach. The bullets were getting rarer, but the shells were multiplying and there were so many shells grazing the ridge line that a man standing there had to be able to catch them in the way.

When I arrived at the beach, I headed to the right, towards the beach exit (D3, Les Moulins?). There I saw a large number of men and officers lying and doing nothing. Some were injured, but most seemed shocked. I met Colonel Bingham (Cdt.ème Battalion 2/116). He asked me if I saw any soldiers on the 2/116, and I told him what I knew. He asked for my help to get the men together. Captain Cawthon was with him. A shrapnel had crossed his two cheeks and he was spitting blood while talking, it didn't seem to bother him. Together with them and others and Captain Scott, I gathered about 40 men separated from their sections and we climbed through the track I had previously followed. We continued along a road to a point immediately east of Saint-Laurent. There we met groups from the 1stera Div (?? What unit? (b) The question of whether or not a person is entitled to benefit from the benefit of the public service. Bingham turned right to enter St-Laurent (the town) . It was 1:00.

Then I went north for a little distance, and I ran into the 3rd.ème battalion in its assembly area (to the north of St-Laurent so?). When Cie I/116 went to the Mills in the middle of the afternoon, I was there to observe it. The artillery fire, coming from within against the plateau occupied by the Company, was terrible and it seemed remarkable to me that the position could be held. There was with me a Captain of Signals (293)ème JASCO). He was suspicious of the Saint-Laurent bell tower, which could allow well-placed German observers to direct these shots. So he called the Navy, and luck wanted the first shell to hit the bell tower and destroy it.
After that, German fire was less accurate, but they were so fed that Bingham decided to direct his men west across the field (instead of entering Saint-Laurent?).

At 8:30 p.m., I decided to try to go to the Moulins by road (by the coast, it seems, after going down the hill). At that time, we no longer attack and we had no information indicating that the road was open (the D3 exit from the Moulins), but I thought the best thing was to go see myself. I walked into the hamlet and didn't meet anything first. Then I ran into some of my own vehicles going up there. The drivers told me that they had been told that the Navy shells would destroy the last positions late in the afternoon. As I was uncertain about the situation in my own area, I sent the vehicles back to the right flank of the 1st.era Division (i.e. towards the Ruquet) where I felt they would be safer.

I then went back to Vierville by the beach, I was looking for the regimental staff (116RCT) but I had been given false information at the battalion headquarters and I went too far to the right, beyond the regimental positions, and I continued in German territory for about 800m (so west of Vierville?). Gradually I realized my mistake and came back on my feet. (the regimental PC was just south of Vierville)

Some vehicles had settled for the night in the "Transit Area 1", to the right of the regiment's PC. Their safety was my immediate concern, because I knew that there were very few infantry on screen in front of them.

At 4:30 a.m., these infantry groups began to retreat in front of the little castle where I was. I asked them where they were going, and they said, "We are leaving, the Germans are coming behind us." There was now with me Lieutenant Garing, my sergeants, a Ranger officer and 7 his men. Knowing the tactical situation, it was obvious that the "Transit Area 1" would be uncovered after this withdrawal, so we set up a small aggressive force and attacked through the hedges while shooting continuously. We met some enemy snipers who had already occupied the ground left empty by the infantry, but as our shots ended up reaching their positions, they escaped back. I believe that we have succeeded because each of us has fired with the maximum of his means. We continued to advance to the main road (which is the road to Formigny ??) and then returned to the "Transit Area 1". These movements took place between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. We thought that this small counterattack, very brief, had eliminated any immediate danger, and by reaching Transit Area 1, we resumed our various activities.

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