Report of the operations of Company C/116
(Lieutenant Shea interviewed the men after the battle)
"For D-Day landings on Omaha Beach the Cie C/116 men were divided into 6 ship sections. The 6 LCVPs were to approach H+50 (07h20), on Dog Green in one wave.
The company's mission was to follow Company A and Company B that had already landed (6:30 and 7:00), to reach the heights of Vierville and continue to ensure various defined objectives, the first of which was the hamlet of Gruchy, 2 km west of Vierville.
2 of the Company's 6 LCVPs were assigned to special sections, called "Assaut Sections" 1 and 2. These 2 sections were equipped to clean all remaining defences after the passage of Cies A and B. Both were equipped with special weapons, including flamethrowers, explosive charges, "Bangalores" explosive poles, 60mm mortars and bazookas. With this equipment, the 2 sections could destroy any isolated fort or fortification that would have been spared by the first two companies.
The other 4 ships carried "Support Sections" (ordinary sections of riflemen to which the weapons of the heavy weapons section of the company had been attached). One section had a 60mm mortar team, the other two had a light machine gun each. A boat was carrying Captain Berthier Hawks, CO. Cie, with Company HQ staff.
Finally, a section of Company D (heavy weapons), led by Lieutenant Verne V. Morse was to approach a few minutes before (07:10). A 7mm5 water-cooled machine gun platoon and a 81mm mortar platoon were thus assigned to the direct support of Company C in its march on Gruchy.
Morse's group had to land before it could unload its heavy weapons and begin to climb the coast of Vierville while the more lightly equipped Cie C's riflemen landed. The theoretical tactical arrangements specified that Company C's men would pass the section of the D midway through the Vierville coast and that from that moment Morse would be placed under Captain Hawks' command for the use of heavy weapons.
The bad sea, a fresh wind coming from the northwest, a strong current ferry and the general confusion in landings were combined to prevent the 6 LCVPs from approaching the right place, at the right time, and in the right order. By carefully reconstructing the events it was possible to describe their landing.
It is generally believed that Assaut 2 was the first to touch ground. Technical Sergeant Walden D. Huffer, Deputy Head of the Section, describes his collision as follows:
" The men were crouched in the LCVP. They realized the approach to the shore and were about to rush to the beach as soon as the ramp fell. They were all calm, waiting for the hull to scrape on sand or gravel."
"As the rollers approached the collision point, they plunged and lifted the boat up abruptly. They were still en route and at the top of a wave when the men felt the bottom of the ship hit something. A moment after the blow, which resonated as if the hull had struck an underwater obstacle, the ship hesitated, then poured to the side, sending the men and their equipment in 1 to 2 meters of water."
"All special equipment, flamethrowers, explosive charges, bangalores and mortars were lost while we were thrown at the bay," Huffer said.
In confusion, the men took foot and headed towards the beach in the rollers.
Huffer and Sergeants Albert V. Dopolski and Anthony J. Palembas confirmed "that there were no other troops" on the beach when they approached. They thought there might be 4 or 5 tanks in sight, but at least 3 were out of order, and although 1 or 2 were firing from time to time, men doubted that they could ever leave the beach to fight.
The exact location of the collision was determined in 3 ways. First, a medium tank mentioned by the witness who sheltered behind (according to J. T. Shea). The men were 40 to 50 meters east of this tank. Second, later, the arrival of LCI 91 (which was burned) which failed 150 to 170m west. Third, a second LCI, was destroyed 40 m further east. Witnesses don't remember if he caught fire like LCI 91 and don't remember his N° (probably LCI 92, which ran aground at about 8:00 a.m. under Villa Richard, the LCI 91 having previously run aground at about 7:40 a.m. in front of the 1st cemetery, in the middle of the beach) The soaked men dragged through the beach to a small wooden retaining wall along the seafront. They were clinging against each other while the other LCVP poured their human cargo onto the sand. The reinforcement of the assault forces was then quite rapid at this time, because "in 10 to 15 minutes" the men of Section Assaut 2 were joined by Rangers, sappers of the Special Engineer Brigade and other troops, all tight on the pebble bench which was adorned with the wooden wall.
(These are the 450 Rangers of the 5th Battalion (arrived on 14 LCA), sappers of the 147th Beach Engineer Bat and the 121st Engineer Combat Bat, of the 116th Regiment HQ, arrived on LCI 91 and 92, and of course the rest of Company C. General Cota and Colonel Canham also arrived at that time and at the same place on a LCVP)
Trying to reconstitute the sequence of events, it is thought that the boat of Section Assaut 2 had to approach before 0653. The exact order of arrival of the 6 Cie ships is impossible to find in the confusion of this day.
The only time indicated was from the testimony of Sergeant Francis E. Huesset, light machine gun platoon leader, in the Support Section of Lieutenant Schwartz. Huesset said: "We touched at 6:53. Lieutenant Schwartz looked at his watch when the ramp started to descend and he told us the time." Huesset also remembers that the LCI "who caught fire" was only 25m to the right of its section. This LCI approached after the arrival of Huesset's LCVP. (This LCI 91 arrived at about 7:40)
All agree that the Cie C men were agglutinated against the wall between the 2 LCI (so it had to be from 8:00, arrival of the 2nd LCI). We can therefore be sure that the Cie C arrived in advance from 20 to 30 minutes (i.e. around 07:00), and about 1000 to 1300m east of the prescribed place (Dog Green).
(Given the following, this very advanced schedule is doubtful, based solely on Huesset's testimony)
While the men were crouched against the wall, sounded by a brutal landing, the mortars, cannons and "Nebelwerfer" fell on the beach (this artillery aimed at the LCI who appeared from 7:30 a.m.; they saw LCI 91 go in. They estimate that this unlucky LCI arrived 4 or 5 minutes after them (it is very doubtful because it was scheduled for 7:40 a.m., or 35 minutes later, the memories are probably imprecise, perhaps the "6:53" are so wrong, as usually all landings were 5 to 40 minutes late, never really in advance).
Shortly after the LCI was wrapped in a terrible ball of orange fire and oily black smoke. They saw the men of this boat jump overboard, some crewmen futilely trying to throw a rubber dinghy on the port side. (There is a detailed testimony of launching an inflatable raft, but on LCI 92, which arrived in the vicinity shortly after LCI 91, perhaps there is confusion, this is not uncommon in the accounts of June 6th)